Miami Marlins Jumpstart Their Rebuild with Great Deadline Haul

When the trade deadline was approaching this year, it was clear the Marlins were surefire sellers, having already shipped Luis Arraez out of town a couple months prior with the season getting away not long after it started.

What we didn’t know was what exactly the Marlins had to sell, and how much the market would value the pieces they put on the trade block. Miami Marlins President of Baseball Operations Peter Bendix showed his ability to fully take advantage of his position as a seller at the deadline, moving six players for a litany of prospects, completely overhauling what was one of baseball’s weakest farm systems.

When the Marlins hired Bendix away from the Rays last November, he made it clear that he did not want to shake up the roster too much until he had more time to assess the entire organizational situation. “The worst thing you can do is evaluate players too soon and come to the wrong conclusion,” he said in May.

While a valid sentiment, Bendix was likely already quite familiar with the team’s rocky longterm outlook, knowing if he was going to build a sustainable winner in Miami, some unpopular decisions were going to need to be made.

How the Marlins Became Sellers

On the surface, the state of the Marlins organization may have appeared far more rosy. Last year, the team made the playoffs in a full season for the first time since 2003, which many point towards when citing understandable frustration in seeing yet another Marlins sell off.

As nice as the 84-78 season was, the expanded postseason field means a playoff appearance does not correlate with sustainable winning like it used to. After all, the Marlins -57 run differential was the worst mark for a playoff team in MLB history.

Bendix inherited a playoff team that few people and no projection systems expected to get back there along with one of the least favorable organizational situations in baseball. The Marlins ran out Joey Wendle, Jon Berti and Garrett Hampson in order to piece together the shortstop situation with a defensively limited Xavier Edwards appearing to be the only semi-viable contingency plan both short-term and long-term.

The catcher situation was arguably worse, splitting the duties between Jacob Stallings and Nick Fortes, who combined for a league-worst 54 wRC+ and 0.2 fWAR.

Much like shortstop, the Marlins did not have a viable backstop option at any level before of the Minor Leagues to reasonably project, though 2021 1st rounder Joe Mack’s breakout has been the most positive development in the team’s farm system this season.

The outfield situation was not much better as Marlins outfielders were 23rd in wRC+ and 25th in fWAR in 2023. Jazz Chisholm Jr. gave them something to be excited about, but he entered the 2024 season with just 300 big league games under his belt since he debuted in 2020 and only slightly above average offensive numbers for his career.

As it became increasingly clear an extension probably was not happening in Miami and 2024 clearly got away, holding onto Chisholm Jr. made less sense.

Luis Arraez brought the team a refreshing feel to hit and a level of offensive consistency that had not been seen since the Stanton and Yelich days, but a contact-oriented second baseman who grades out as one of the sport’s worst defenders is more of a complementary piece than a building block with just one year of control after 2024.

Losing Jorge Soler’s .853 OPS via free agency hurt the Marlins offense, but with $28.5 million owed to Josh Bell and Avisail Garcia in 2024 and $9.3 million more committed to Sandy Alcantara who will not pitch until 2025 due to Tommy John surgery, matching the Giants offer of 3 years, $36 million for Soler was going to be a tough sell to owner Bruce Sherman, even if Bendix wanted to bring him back. The Giants may have had some buyers remorse of their own, dumping Soler’s contract to the Braves at the trade deadline.

More bad news hit the Marlins during Spring Training as their star 21-year-old right-hander Eury Perez would also miss all of 2024 with Tommy John surgery, while Braxton Garrett dealt with shoulder discomfort that would result in him not being available to start the year either.

One of baseball’s worst defensive teams in 2023 still needed to find a shortstop and now their pitching strength was quickly thinning. Even if the Marlins front office wanted to maintain whatever perceived momentum the franchise generated from its 2023 playoff appearance, there were few viable free agents within budget and not a single 50 future value position player prospect in the system.

The frustration from Marlins fans who were teased by a playoff appearance just to see the team liquidated is justified, but unlike the Marlins organizational talent, the situation was more layered than that. It’s no secret that Bruce Sherman has long been enamored by the Rays model–I would be too if I didn’t have capital to spend–and Bendix was brought in to build an infrastructure that would give the team a chance to sustainably churn out talent like the team a few hundred miles upstate.

While I agree with the sentiment that the Rays model should not be the only option, there’s not much Bendix and the rest of the Marlins front office can do about it besides win the powerball.

The Rays model can surely be frustrating for fans, but no more than a cheap team cosplaying as a spender. Trying to operate like the big market teams when you are financially incapable is what the Derek Jeter era can be boiled down to. That’s what leaves you with one of baseball’s worst farm systems and $53 million tied to Avisail Garcia.

Looking ahead towards the future, the Marlins set the course of being a seller in 2024, with the goal of bringing as much talent into the organization as possible. Injuries to Jesus Luzardo and Garrett further complicated the matter, but Bendix was able to find value in shopping every piece the Marlins had to move.

Taking What the Market Gives You

The Marlins were far and away the busiest team at the Trade Deadline, cashing in on just about any and every asset possible to replenish and refresh the farm system. In a position where any and all talent is welcome, more upper-minor league talent was available at the deadline than the Marlins front office may have expected, which could expedite the turnaround time on the Marlins rebuild.

The initial plan was to reportedly compile as much lower level, high upside talent as possible, but as trade conversations continued to steer towards upper-minors talent the Marlins pivoted and targeted prospects who could fill voids for the team as soon as next season.

With a pitching staff that could still be among the best in the National League when healthy, the offense does not necessarily need to be potent to be competitive.

Instead of relying on a couple of hitters to buoy an offense weighed down by a handful of gaping holes in the lineup, the Marlins added upper-level talent at several positions where the organization had no realistic help on the way from Miami to Beloit.

Fans may be jaded from a low hit rate on prospects in previous years, but acquiring Minor League talent without any respectable player development infrastructure is like planting seeds in a garden and hoping the rain and sun will take care of it. Since Bendix has taken over, he has been outspoken about the importance of providing players with the resources they need to reach closest to their potential.

Trading Jazz Chisholm Jr. to the Yankees

In the Chisholm trade alone, the Marlins picked up their clear future of the catcher position in Agustin Ramirez, as well as Jared Serna, a shortstop who instantly became their most well-rounded middle infield prospect. Both 22 years old, Ramirez was assigned to Triple-A Jacksonville while Serna started his Marlins career with a promotion to Double-A Pensacola.

Ramirez may be fringe-average defensively, but offers plus power and ample bat-to-ball skills. He is a September call up candidate with a real chance of breaking camp with the Marlins next season. His swing can be too downhill at times, resulting in more ground balls than desired. He has done a better job of pulling the ball in the air this season, highlighted by his career-best 20 home runs.

As for Serna, he added impact, now producing above average exit velocities while improving his footwork and range at shortstop. Serna could take over shortstop duties by mid-season with the emergent Xavier Edwards sliding over to second base.

A quick look at the 2025 free agent class further solidifies the importance of acquiring prospects who could potentially slot in at shortstop and catcher in the near future. Another position where the Marlins had little-to-no organizational depth is the hot corner. Even at the MLB level, Jake Burger has struggled mightily offensively and is stretched thin defensively at the position.

Filling Positional Needs Across the Diamond and Down the Depth Chart

There’s still more work to be done on the left side of the infield in terms of the organizational depth chart, which is why the team is opting to get Connor Norby reps at third base in Triple-A Jacksonville before bringing him up to Miami.

Acquired with outfielder Kyle Stowers in the Trevor Rogers deal, Norby already has some big league experience and also has a great chance to crack the Opening Day roster next season.

Graham Pauley–who was acquired in the Tanner Scott/Bryan Hoeing deal–is a utility type who can also be a potential option at the hot corner if the bat comes along as track development normalized. In true AJ Preller fashion, Pauley cracked the Opening Day roster for the Padres despite having only played 23 games above High-A.

The 13th round pick in 2022 was one of the most impressive hitters in the Minor Leagues in 2023, standing out as one of 10 Minor League hitters who hit 20 home runs and stole 20 bases while maintaining a strikeout rate below 25%. Slowing down Pauley’s development should help the Marlins more properly assess what they may have in the 2023 breakout prospect.

Of course, the center field situation has long been ugly for the Marlins as well, as to be expected when you don’t have a single 50 future value position player prospect in the organization. Victor Mesa Jr. may have been the closest in that regard, grading out as a fringe-regular (45 FV) in our soon-to-be released Marlins top prospect list. That said, there’s a reason the team moved Chisholm Jr. to center field despite having no experience off of the dirt.

Bendix and co. got a head start on improving the team’s situation up the middle, targeting Padres 2023 first round pick Dillon Head as the headliner in the Luis Arraez trade back in May. Before going down with an adductor injury, Head and his elite wheels slotted into the back end of Just Baseball’s Top 100 prospect list. The Marlins also targeted center fielder Jakob Marsee alongside Head in the deal, another above average glove up the middle.

After a standout campaign in 2023, the newly-turned 23-year-old has met his match in Double-A, turning in a 104 wRC+ that is mostly buoyed by his 16% walk rate. His plus plate discipline, superb base running (40 for 43 on stolen base attempts this year) and batted ball data that paints a better picture than the stat line give him a good chance to at least be fourth outfield type. I still see the potential for bulk platoon option here, especially with the defensive ability at all three outfield spots.

Stowers is another iron in the fire who is capable of playing a fine center field as well, but likely projects as a part time outfielder due to hit-tool concerns. Not quite the caliber of prospect of the aforementioned players, Andrew Pintar (AJ Puk deal) also slots in as a back-end top 30 prospect who can stick up the middle defensively.

Finding Much-Needed Power-Hitting Prospects

In entirely unsurprising news, the Marlins also lacked prospects with plus power, or even plus power to dream on. Kemp Aldermann, Griffin Conine and Paul McIntosh were the only Minor Leaguers in the organization with a 90th percentile exit velocity above 106 mph.

Two of the prospects the Marlins added at the deadline slot in at first and second in the organization in 90th percentile exit velocity with the aforementioned Agustin Ramirez trailing only Deyvison De Los Santos (AJ Puk deal) for tops in the Minor Leagues in that regard.

De Los Santos has been one of the most productive bats in the Minor Leagues this year, albeit with some warts to his offensive profile.

There’s not a ton of precedent for players with a chase rate above 40% and contact rate below 70% in the Minor Leagues having sustained success at the big league level, but there’s also few hitters who strike the ball as consistently hard as De Los Santos does.

Somehow just 21 years old, De Los Santos has little more to prove at the Triple-A level, slashing .296/.348/.607 in 52 games while launching 30 home runs in 90 total games this season.

The free-swinging slugger could be an option at third base in a pinch as well, projecting better at first base. There could be volatility that is reminiscent of Jake Burger, however he boasts the best raw power in the farm system and is another candidate to see big league action late in this season and/or break camp with the Marlins next year.

Buying Low On Pitching

Heading into 2024, the only Marlins prospects who realistically projected as MLB regulars were pitchers in Thomas White, Noble Meyer and Max Meyer, the former two were drafted with the team’s first two selections last year. With the controllable pitching talent at the big league level and the Marlins top two prospects being arms, the idea of acquiring pitching had been less discussed.

While stockpiling hitters was the clear priority, it would be shortsighted to pass up on the opportunity to accumulate as much talent as possible. The Tanner Scott and Bryan Hoeing trade is a prime example of just that. The team added two infield bats in Pauley and Beshears, though the two most valuable pieces happened to be pitchers who the Padres were willing to part with.

Robby Snelling is the headliner and while the 20-year-old’s 6.01 ERA may suggest otherwise, he was Just Baseball’s Minor League Pitcher of the Year last season, pitching to a 1.82 ERA in his first pro season across Low-A, High-A and Double-A.

His fastball quality has waned this year, both from a shape and command perspective and his breaking ball has looked like a different offering as well, two ticks slower, lacking the sharpness it featured when it performed as an above average pitch last season. The changeup has been there for Snelling, which ironically was quite spotty for him last season.

Snelling is far from the first pitcher to hit a metaphorical wall in the Padres organization, which scouts far better than it develops. The Marlins capitalized on just that with Ryan Weathers, who has looked like a rotation piece for them this season with some positive tweaks. There were some dark days for MacKenzie Gore in the Padres system prior to his trade to the Nationals as well.

Gore and Weathers have better stuff than Snelling, but the former four star linebacker recruit is an elite athlete on the mound with a frame that could accommodate more mass and velocity.

At the end of last season, Snelling was pitching his way into being regarded as one of the best left-handed pitching prospects in baseball, now he’s off top 100 lists. If the Marlins can get the southpaw somewhere in between, it’s already a big win.

Adam Mazur has ridden a similar rollercoaster in a shorter period of time, dominating Double-A to the tune of a 1.95 ERA before earning a promotion to the hitter-friendly Pacific Coast League where run prevention numbers are to be taken with a grain of salt.

Called up to San Diego shortly after, the 23-year-old looked like a dear in headlights. His plus command waned as he nibbled and lost trust in his stuff.

Similar to Snelling, Mazur’s pitchability is what has made him successful previously, and when that goes, there’s not enough in zone whiff to overcome it. Though his fastball averages 95 mph, it lacks desired characteristics, making it quite hittable. His elite command of his slider allowed it to perform as a plus pitch in the Minor Leagues and if he can recapture that along with some tweaks to his fastball and sequencing, he could be a solid back-end starter.

The team added some exciting upside at the lower levels as well in the Bryan De La Cruz deal, acquiring right-hander Jun-Seok Shim, who entered this season as a top 10 prospect in the Pirates system for Just Baseball before injuries derailed another season for the 20-year-old.

Signed for $750,000 out of South Korea in 2023, Shim has struggled to stay on the field dating back to his amateur days and has only tossed eight innings as a pro. In those eight innings, he flashed eye-popping data. The fastball was in the mid 90s with strong characteristics, while his sweeper averaged 18-20 inches of horizontal break and his curveball eclipsed 3,200 RPM.

State of the Farm System and Franchise

In a span of a few months, Marlins were able to capitalize on what was perceived by the industry as a sellers market, so much so that one of baseball’s worst farm systems now looks like its approaching the top third of the league.

It is worth noting that they were able to do that without parting with their most valuable trade chip, Jesus Luzardo. In June, the left-handed pitcher hit the IL for what will likely be the remainder of the season with a lumbar spine reaction. Still just 26 years old and under control for two more seasons, the Marlins could cash in during the offseason or sometime next season assuming the talented starter is back in form.

The layers of talent that Bendix has been eager to acquire is already visible on the pitching side. How the Marlins will handle their face-of-the-franchise in Sandy Alcantara will remain to be seen as he works his way back with three years of club control. Eury Perez is clearly a building block, not set to hit free agency until 2030.

Braxton Garrett, Edward Cabrera, Ryan Weathers and Max Meyer will also be under team control for at least four years, with the latter two still in pre-arbitration next season. Should Snelling develop the way the Marlins hope, Garrett could be expendable, capable of funneling plenty more talent into the farm system if he returns to his 2023 form.

A franchise like the Marlins–in a literal sense–cannot afford to have a weak farm system. It’s the only currency that can help them close the gap on major markets. It’s not just the Rays, teams like the Guardians, Brewers and now Orioles keep themselves afloat by carefully building and managing their assets.

Barring a South Florida Steve Cohen inserting themselves into the picture, the only thing Bendix can change is the organizational approach. Under Bruce Sherman, the Marlins have signed just four players to deals worth more than $10 million: Avisail Garcia ($53 million), Jorge Soler ($36 million), Corey Dickerson ($17.5 million) and Jean Segura ($17 million).

Rather than spending the majority of budgeted payroll on players the team hoped would provide MLB-regular production (only Jorge Soler posted a season with an fWAR above 1.0 in Miami), it would behoove of the small-market Marlins to prioritize a sustainably strong farm system rather than fight for the free agency scraps with the bottom feeders.

Sure, that may mean some frustrating trade deadlines where the Marlins do not buy as aggressively as fans would like to see when they’re in the hunt…I’m looking at you Orioles. Even then, when the farm is deep, it affords teams the ability to add talent they would never be able to attain in free agency, like the Orioles trade for Corbin Burns.

The flip side is this approach may also mean more Jazz Chisholm-type trades as players get deeper into arbitration, but without forced C-list free agent deals that wind up financially handcuffing the team anyways, there is actually some room to offer team-friendly extensions to players who are identified as building blocks.

Hoping to catch lightning in a bottle and then depleting what scraps are left of a farm system that is duct taped together by antiquated scouting and minimal player development infrastructure is as much of a reason why the Marlins are consistently rebuilding as their reluctance to spend.

With the latter unlikely to change, it is even more imperative for the front office to alter its approach. This type of baseball may not be for everyone, but the last decade of Marlins baseball is for no one.